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Laurence H. Meyer
This is a topic of very special interest to me as I served on the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) during the period the equity bubble was
building. As the bubble was emerging, I was operating along the lines of
what I have come to call the “indirect approach” to monetary policy, an ap-
proach that Greenspan clearly encouraged at the time and later defended
vigorously and an approach that Ben Bernanke provided intellectual sup-
port for in a paper written before he became a governor and then chairman
of the Fed (Greenspan 2002; Bernanke 2002).
According to the indirect approach, monetary policy should be adjusted
only in response to changes in output gaps or inﬂation—current or pro-
spective—and, therefore, should not directly respond to any other vari-
ables, including equity prices, housing prices, or exchange rates.
I have to admit, however, that the experience with the indirect approach
in the second half of the 1990s did not turn out entirely well, though the
Fed did very eﬀectively execute what Alan Blinder has called the “mopping
up” strategy: being alert to the possibility that a possible asset bubble will
abruptly correct and quickly adjusting policy in the case of a discontinu-
ous adjustment to maintain aggregate demand (Blinder and Reis 2005).
But with the beneﬁt of hindsight, I look back at that experience and
wonder whether monetary policy could have been better managed to miti-
gate the risks to future macroeconomic performance associated with an
emerging equity bubble. I admit that today I still do not know the answer
to that question, but my greatest regret about my time on the FOMC is how
little time we as a committee devoted to thinking about the appropriate
monetary policy response to the suspected equity bubble. So I appreciate
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perience and ask whether there is some approach beyond the indirect one
that might have improved macroeconomic outcomes.
I start by identifying the three basic approaches to responding to a sus-
picion of an emerging equity bubble: the indirect approach, pricking the
bubble, and an intermediate approach, sometimes referred to as “leaning
against the bubble.” I want to explore the meaning and case for the inter-
mediate approach and then consider another way of potentially leaning
against an emerging asset bubble—not through the adjustment of the pol-
icy rate, but through Fed communication.
Direct and Indirect Approaches
The indirect approach is actually a broader vision for monetary policy
that implies policymakers should ignore more than just asset prices in set-
ting policy. This approach, summarized well by the Taylor rule and its suc-
cessors, holds that monetary policymakers should adjust policy in relation
to actual or forecasted changes in output gaps and inﬂation, period. They
should not respond directly to any other variables, be they asset prices or
anything else. The beauty of the indirect approach in the context of today’s
conference is that monetary policy is driven to indirectly lean against asset
bubbles by following this strategy, at least to the extent that the rise in as-
set prices strengthens aggregate demand and, hence, growth; raises output
gaps; and increases the risk of higher inﬂation. But any move to tighter pol-
icy in this case should be in proportion to the increase in actual or prospec-
tive output gaps and inﬂation, not calibrated to bring about a given ad-
justment in asset prices themselves.
An alternative approach that deviates from these restraints is one that in-
volves a direct response of monetary policy to asset prices, on top of the
traditional focus on output gaps and inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, it allows for
monetary policy to tighten by more than would be justiﬁed by output gaps
and inﬂation when asset prices appear to be moving well beyond their fun-
damental value.
In principle, the direct approach does not call on the Fed to target asset
prices, only to respond to asset price movements in the setting of its policy
rate. But if we introduce this direct response into a Taylor rule, we would
presumably do so by adding a response of the policy rate to the gap be-
tween prevailing asset prices and their estimated fair value. From the per-
spective of the Taylor rule, in this case, it appears that the Fed would be tar-
geting asset prices every bit as much as it would be targeting a preferred
inﬂation rate and the Fed’s estimate of the economy’s natural rate of un-
employment. But perhaps the better way of viewing such an expanded Tay-
lor rule is that it allows for a trade-oﬀ between improving the near-term
macro performance by responding to changes in prevailing or near-term
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possibility of unfavorable macro outcomes later in the event of the abrupt
correction of a signiﬁcant equity bubble.
The direct approach itself comes in two forms. The boldest version calls
for the use of monetary policy to prick an equity bubble. One could inter-
pret this as a directive for the central bank to tighten until it appeared that
asset prices are moving back to their fundamental value. There appear to
be very few, if any, observers of bubbles that argue for this direction. In-
stead, there is more support for a milder version—and this is what I refer
to by “leaning against the bubble”—that calls on monetary policymakers
to tighten modestly more than could be justiﬁed by movements in output
gaps and inﬂation in the face of a suspected emergence of an equity bubble.
This is the approach captured by the modiﬁed Taylor rule discussed in the
preceding.
Why the Indirect Approach Didn’t Work
As I noted in the preceding, the indirect approach itself is intended to
lean against equity bubbles. But, in fact, the FOMC, despite following this
approach, did not tighten during most of the period in second half of the
1990s when equity prices were soaring and when the wealth eﬀect triggered
by rising equity values was powerfully boosting consumer spending. What
went wrong?
First, the productivity acceleration was providing a disinﬂationary im-
petus to the economy at the same time it was boosting proﬁts and the ex-
pected growth rate of earnings. Meeting after meeting, Greenspan would
warn that above trend growth and tightening labor markets were signaling
possible inﬂationary pressures ahead, and we should, therefore, be alert to
the need to tighten—but not yet, not while core inﬂation was itself actually
declining, especially when we didn’t fully understand why.
In eﬀect, even though may of us on the Committee saw ourselves as fol-
lowing an indirect approach, the policy response that otherwise would
have been expected from that approach was short-circuited by Chairman
Greenspan’s perception of a structural break in productivity growth. There
is little doubt now that the productivity break did occur and that
Greenspan was well out in front of both the Committee and the Fed staﬀ
in detecting it. Nevertheless, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, I wonder today
whether the resulting policy path was the best for the economy—and, more
speciﬁcally, whether policy lingered at too low of a funds rate over most of
1999, when equity prices were soaring.
Second, while the FOMC nevertheless thought about tightening on a
number of occasions during this period, it was pulled back again and again
by some external shock—the Asian ﬁnancial crisis spreading to Korea, for
example, and later the global ﬁnancial turbulence of the fall of 1998, culmi-
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deed, in the end, the FOMC eased in the fall of 1998 rather than tightened,
and perhaps not surprisingly, the equity market really blew out in 1999.
The question this experience raises is whether there are conditions under
which the indirect approach is destined to fail to lean against emerging
bubbles (for example, during a period of a productivity acceleration) or
whether the problem is simply that the indirect approach was not really ex-
ecuted during this period.
The “Leaning against the Bubble” Approach
Maybe, and quite likely, the indirect approach is the best we can do, and
we simply have to accept that occasionally we will have periods of specu-
lative excess that will impart some instability to the real economy. But we
should at least be open-minded and indeed actively search for a better ap-
proach. In that spirit, let me oﬀer a few thoughts on the “leaning against
the bubble” approach described in the preceding.
Broadening the Indirect Approach
It seems to me that the indirect approach is often deﬁned too narrowly.
The case for leaning against an asset bubble is not some fetish about keep-
ing asset prices close to some measure of fundamental value, but concern
with the consequences for broader macroeconomic performance should an
asset bubble emerge and then correct discontinuously (as is typically the
case for an equity bubble). In a forward-looking approach to monetary
policy—one in which monetary policy is set in light of the forecast for out-
put gaps and inﬂation—the indirect approach in principle is consistent
with policymakers taking into account the potential risk to future macro-
economic performance from an emerging equity bubble.
The issue here is that policy response dictated by the indirect view seems
to depend importantly on the horizon employed. Consider, for example,
monetary policy during a period of rapidly escalating equity prices to lev-
els that the central bank saw as unwarranted by fundamentals. Does the
indirect approach consider the eﬀect of equity prices on output today, or in
a year, or in two years? Would the magnitude of the policy response in-
crease the longer the horizon considered in the policy rule?
The broader view focuses on the trade-oﬀ between less favorable eco-
nomic performance in the near term from leaning against a bubble and
more favorable economic performance later as a result of avoiding or mit-
igating the adverse eﬀects of the eventual asset market correction. In this
sense, leaning against the bubble really should be classiﬁed as part of the
indirect approach—just one that takes into consideration the entire future
path of output and inﬂation, rather than their values today or in the near-
term future.
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Another way to think about “leaning against the bubble” is the risk man-
agement approach. That is, given the asymmetric downside risks some time
in the future associated with a likely correction of an emerging bubble, is
there a case for tightening more than would otherwise be appropriate to
mitigate the size of the bubble and, therefore, the eventual downside shock
to the economy? This seems very much in the spirit of the risk management
approach, taking out insurance against some high cost but low probability
event. Actually, in this case, at least after some point, it seems like taking
out insurance against a high cost and not so low possibility event, but one
whose timing and severity is still highly uncertain.
The risk management approach suggests that monetary policy should
“err on the side of restraint” when there is a suspicion of an emerging eq-
uity bubble. I think back to the experience in the second half of the 1990s.
Meeting after meeting we would talk about the possibility of tightening
but, most of the time, pull back. In the case of suspicion of an emerging
bubble, perhaps the tie should always go to tighter policy.
Bernanke, while ultimately concluding that the indirect approach is the
best that central bankers can do in practice, nevertheless has oﬀered a
rather sympathetic discussion of the “leaning against the bubble” option
(Bernanke 2002). He says that doing so would be analogous to taking out
insurance against the destabilizing eﬀects of the emergence and ultimate
popping of the bubble. And then he goes on to note that the optimal degree
of insurance is rarely zero. However, he concludes that such an approach,
while plausible in principle, is not likely to be eﬀective in practice, because
a moderate “lean” would have little eﬀect on any asset bubble. That is at
least the question, if not the answer.
Bernanke’s position on leaning against a bubble quite dramatically high-
lights the theme of this conference, the two-way relationship between mon-
etary policy and asset prices—that is, not only how monetary policy
should respond to asset prices, but also how asset prices respond to mone-
tary policy. Bernanke’s argument about the practical limits of leaning
against the bubble suggests that the two sides of this interrelation may be
importantly related. Speciﬁcally, the intermediate approach is more likely
to be eﬀective if monetary policy has a relatively large eﬀect on equity
prices (or housing prices) relative to its eﬀect on broader aggregate de-
mand. Because Bernanke’s reading of the impact of monetary policy on eq-
uity prices is that the eﬀect is surprisingly small, this feeds into his conclu-
sion that leaning against a bubble is unlikely to be eﬀective in practice.
The risk management approach, of course, is very much about taking in-
surance against asymmetric risks. In the case of asset price movements, the
risks seem much greater when asset prices are above than when they are
below a level consistent with fundamentals. If this is the case, there is a
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captured in the simple expanded Taylor rule discussed in the preceding.
Asset markets seem asymmetric in the sense that asset prices seem more
likely to rise smoothly and, beginning from a point of signiﬁcant overval-
uation, to collapse more abruptly. In this case, the risk management ap-
proach would be more relevant to a case when asset prices were above fun-
damentals than when asset prices were below fundamentals.
The risk management approach might also call for a nonlinear response
to an emerging asset bubble. When asset prices are only modestly above
fair value, given the uncertainty in the estimate of fair value, policymakers
might not want to respond at all. But beyond some threshold, a response
could be called for and one that gets disproportionately greater in response
to the divergence from fair value.
Challenges to Going beyond the Indirect Approach
There are to be sure a number of daunting challenges that confront any
strategy that tries to move beyond the narrow indirect approach.
First, there is the so-called identiﬁcation problem, the diﬃculty in iden-
tifying in real time whether there really is a bubble, given the limits of our
knowledge of the determinants of fair value. This may be more relevant,
however, to how quickly it makes sense to take an emerging asset bubble
into account. But I doubt that this consideration should have made poli-
cymakers cautious in concluding that that equities were materially over
valued when the price-earnings (P-E) ratio (for the S&P 500, based on
lagged earnings) got to 25, and they should have been still less cautious
about reaching such a conclusion when the P-E ratio passed 30, and per-
haps there should have been no question at all when the P-E ratio sur-
passed 40. The identiﬁcation problem sometimes seems to be thrown out
as an excuse for not acting, reﬂecting a false sense of humility about what
we know. There really are some things we do know!
Second, and related to the ﬁrst challenge, if it is diﬃcult to respond early
in the process of an emerging bubble, perhaps all the Fed will do if it re-
sponds late in the process is put its ﬁngerprints on the inevitable correction.
Doing so would appear to put the Fed in the “wealth destruction” busi-
ness, not a good place for a central bank to be.
Third, as reﬂected in Bernanke’s views, there is some question about the
relative eﬀect of a rising policy rate on asset prices (especially at a time
when the latter are being driven by speculative frenzy) relative to the eﬀect
more broadly on aggregate demand. The argument here is that it would
take such a large increase in interest rates to blunt an asset bubble that
moving in this direction would almost certainly produce very adverse
macroeconomic outcomes. This is a possibility, but the case here is hardly
deﬁnitive and is worth exploring further.
Fourth, even if we believe there might be an equity bubble and that this
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likely to be very helpful in pinpointing when or how discontinuously the
bubble might burst. That is, the suspicion of an emerging bubble is simply
not very useful for near-term forecasting. The trade-oﬀ is, as a result, be-
tween the high probability of less favorable performance in the near term
against the possibility that there might be more favorable economic per-
formance at some unspeciﬁed point in the future, perhaps outside the pol-
icy horizon of the central bank.
Fifth, the appropriate policy response has to depend on the assumption
about the bubble process going forward. If the bubble were assumed to
continue to escalate, then presumably the policy response would be con-
siderably larger even under the indirect approach. If it were assumed to
quickly pop, the indirect approach might advocate no response at all, or
even an easier policy stance. The lack of understanding of bubble dynam-
ics makes it very diﬃcult to operationalize the broader vision of the indi-
rect approach developed in the preceding.
Sixth, the fact that the emergence of the equity bubble initially strength-
ens aggregate demand while the ultimate correction will potentially seri-
ously undermine aggregate demand further increases the challenge to
monetary policymakers. Indeed, it raises a question about the merits of
raising interest rates to mitigate the risks to future macro performance of
an emerging equity bubble. If the policy response comes too late in the
speculative cycle, it could precipitate and indeed reinforce the adverse
eﬀect on aggregate demand of the bursting of the bubble.
Fed Communication: A Tool for Addressing Bubbles
While I have tried to open up the discussion of moving beyond the nar-
row indirect approach, I have not deﬁnitively made the case for doing so. I
did the best I could. But given the challenges associated with using the pol-
icy rate for combating a bubble, perhaps we should look for other vehicles.
It seems to me that there may also be an important and mostly unex-
ploited role for Fed communication in leaning against emerging bubbles.
When we think of Fed communication in the context of suspected bubbles,
we usually focus on comments by a Fed chairman directly raising the pos-
sibility that asset prices may be overvalued. The most famous of these, of
course, was Greenspan’s “irrational exuberance” comment in December
1996 (Greenspan 1996). However, such direct verbal interventions tend to
be rare.
The question of whether a Fed chairman should ever talk about equity
prices reminds me of one of my favorite Fed stories that I included in my
book A Term at the Fed (Meyer 2004). The incident was about the foreign
exchange market rather than the equity market, but could equally well have
been about the equity market. Joe Coyne, the Fed’s director of public aﬀairs
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calm the foreign exchange market. Volcker was of the school that you did
not talk about equity prices or exchange rates, so he resisted. The argument
went on as Volcker sat down in the barber’s chair. In the middle of a further
attempt by Coyne to persuade the chairman, Volcker interrupted Joe and
turned to Lenny the barber and asked him what he thought. Lenny re-
sponded with a very thoughtful answer supporting the chairman, prompt-
ing Volcker to turn to Coyne and ask, “Joe, can you cut hair?” So the point
is that Fed chairman have traditionally been reluctant to comment on the
reasonableness of equity values or exchange rates.
I would argue that this is the wrong perspective. In fact, the Fed should
talk often and forcefully about how it sees asset prices relative to their fair
values. Why is this taboo? The two most common explanations are, one,
that markets may overreact to such proclamations and, two, that funda-
mentals are hard to measure. In my view, the second consideration should
not stop the central bank. Market participants are aware of the challenges
involved here—they do it for a living. The markets will take the informa-
tion for what it is worth—a reasonable but imperfect measure of the ap-
propriate valuation of asset prices. It gives market participants an addi-
tional piece of information to use to the degree that they see ﬁt, and I
believe that they will ﬁlter it considerably, which should mitigate any con-
cerns about a market overreaction.
It seems likely that market participants would dismiss small deviations
from the fair values published by the Fed. After all, it is hard to predict
what might happen to a 5 percent over- or undervaluation in the S&P 500.
However, the approach would have more bite when asset prices moved well
out of line, as in the late 1990s. If the Fed were to publish a deviation of that
magnitude, it might make market participants think more clearly about the
fundamentals that must be assumed to justify current equity prices. This
could have been a useful deterrent to rising equity market values in the late
1990s, in that the assumptions required were quite extreme.
Thus, this approach could eﬀectively lean against bubbles without re-
quiring a response of the short-term interest rate and the economic costs
associated with it. It also seems consistent with Bernanke’s emphasis on
transparency.
Let me oﬀer a speciﬁc proposal: the Fed should publish an oﬃcial report
on the determinants of fair value in the equity market (and perhaps in
other asset markets) and then provide periodic (perhaps quarterly) updates
assessing the value of asset prices relative to fair value. The report, and pe-
riodic updates of the measures it includes, would be posted on the Board’s
Web site.
One advantage of this approach is that the Fed chairman would not have
to decide if or when to make verbal interventions in the case of a suspected
emergence of an asset bubble. The updates would follow a ﬁxed schedule,
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the assessment of fair value from the Fed’s analysis, increasingly so when
there was the suspicion of an emerging equity bubble. The chairman and
other FOMC members could reinforce this by explicitly noting any im-
portant divergence, but the media would do most of the work. The cover-
age on the Web site could also include comments and analysis from schol-
ars in the ﬁeld so that the public had easy access to an academic consensus
as well as the Fed’s own reading.
This approach could be broadened to apply to a variety of risk spreads
as well as equity prices. Indeed, what I am suggesting is very close to what
Donald L. Kohn did in a speech delivered last July (Kohn 2005). In that pa-
per, Kohn noted that the Fed routinely monitors risk premiums on equi-
ties, corporate bonds, and Treasury securities, in part because these mea-
sures are viewed as indicators of economic conditions but also because
they can directly aﬀect real economic activity. And they are also important
tools for monitoring ﬁnancial stability.
Kohn followed this speech up with the following comment in a talk ear-
lier this year:
Notwithstanding the controversial aspects of identifying bubbles, poli-
cymakers may still want to warn the public about the possibility of asset
price misalignments when the evidence merits. Such talk might do some
good by prompting investors to stop and rethink their assumptions. And
talk by itself should not do much lasting harm even if valuations turn out
to be justiﬁed—provided, of course, that words are not seen as precur-
sors to action under circumstances in which conventional policy would
still be the best approach. (Kohn 2006)
This approach might take the Fed in the direction of some other central
banks in publishing a ﬁnancial stability report that focuses on ﬁnancial
vulnerabilities.
How would this have worked in the second half of the 1990s? Recall that
the P-E ratio (for the S&P 500 based on lagged earnings) at the time that
Greenspan uttered his famous irrational exuberance remark was about 18.
That was basically in the middle of the range of estimates of fair value for
the P-E ratio—from a low of about 14 or 15 that is the longer run histori-
cal average for the P-E ratio to the low 20 range that Jeremy Siegel has ar-
gued is warranted today (Siegel 2002). In any case, a P-E ratio of around 18
would not really have seemed the critical time to weigh in about the possi-
bility of an equity bubble. So this approach probably would have taken
some of the sting out of Greenspan’s question—although the fact is that
there was not much sting to begin with—less than a 2 percent drop that
day. This simply reﬂects the fact that, in my view, Greenspan was rather
precocious at this point.
Still, we wonder if this approach might have had some restraining eﬀect
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bubble became more compelling. The Fed presumably would have been on
record as believing that fair value is somewhere between, say, 14 and, say,
21 for the P-E ratio and would have strongly emphasized the evidence of
the mean reverting nature of equity prices. That might itself help. Every
time a story was written on whether there was a bubble, the Fed’s study
would invariably be mentioned and the authority of the Fed would be put
behind a presumption that a bubble was emerging.
As I noted earlier, a clear case could have been made that equity valua-
tions were very rich when the P-E ratio surpassed, say, 25, and, by the time
it crossed 30, there should have been few doubters that a bubble was emerg-
ing, and when it approached and surpassed 40—well, you get the picture.
The emphasis on the fundamental value of asset prices will likely high-
light the role of mean reversion. One thing market participants should be
conﬁdent about is that when equity valuations move dramatically above
the fair value range, they will ultimately correct back.
Some will perhaps argue that this approach would not have been very
convincing in this episode because the fundamentals of the period were un-
usually favorable to equity valuations, and it was simply not so obvious
that the historical norms applied anymore. We were after all in the “new
economy,” and the economy did at the time seem to be breaking all the old
rules. That is precisely the reasoning that should have been leaned against,
I say with the beneﬁt of hindsight.
Still the argument might go, even with the beneﬁt of hindsight, if there
was an acceleration of productivity in play at the time and that meant faster
growth in output, earnings, and dividends. Plug that into your dividend
discount model. Doesn’t that justify an increase in the sustainable P-E ra-
tio? The answer is not necessarily and, in any case, not necessarily by much.
The Fed report could point out the diﬀerence between arithmetic and
economics when it comes to assessing equity valuations. It is arithmetically
correct that a persistent increase in the growth rate of earnings, ceteris
paribus, would raise the value of equities in the dividend discount frame-
work. But ceteris paribusis just a fancy Latin name for partial equilibrium.
Sound economic analysis is about general equilibrium. In a general equi-
librium model, we would have to ask how a productivity acceleration
aﬀects other pieces of the dividend discount model. The answer, of course,
is that a productivity acceleration, if persistent, would also raise the equi-
librium real interest rate, oﬀsetting much if not all the increase in the P-E
ratio associated with the faster growth in earnings.
The same logic applies to the argument that soaring equity values was a
reasonable response to a plausible decline in the equity premium in a world
with less real side volatility and less inﬂation volatility than previously. A
decline in the equity premium, of course, ceteris paribus,would raise equity
values in the dividend discount model. There is that pesky ceteris paribus
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also lead, over time, to an increase in the equilibrium real rate, reversing
some or all of the earlier rise in equity prices.
So perhaps the message should be that it is hard for changes in economic
fundamentals to dramatically alter fair value norms and that asset prices
are powerfully mean reverting (relative to fundamentals), and, therefore,
attention should always be focused on the fair value norm.
The Bottom Line
The bottom line is that we ought be actively engaged in a discussion
about whether monetary policy could improve relative to the narrow inter-
pretation of the indirect approach. I hope I have been able to contribute to
that discussion. I do not have much conﬁdence in the leaning against the
bubble approach, but I think we have to seriously consider what the risk
management approach implies during such periods in the context of a
broader vision of the indirect approach and consider whether it would be
prudent in such circumstances to at least to err on the side of restraint. I
am somewhat more conﬁdent that the direction I suggested in terms of Fed
communication might at least provide a modest restraining eﬀect during a
period of an emerging asset bubble. I think the Fed should consider mov-
ing in this direction, and I actually believe they may already have begun to
do so.
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William C. Dudley
As I see it, a Federal Reserve consensus exists on how monetary policy
should respond to asset bubbles. It consists of three major observations:
1. Asset bubbles are hard to identify.
2. Monetary policy is not well-suited to respond to bubbles.
3. The cost/beneﬁt trade-oﬀ of “leaning against the wind” against asset
bubbles is unfavorable.
From these propositions, two important policy implications directly
follow:
1. The central bank should only take asset bubbles into consideration in
the conduct of monetary policy to the extent that these asset bubbles aﬀect
the growth/inﬂation outlook.
2. The monetary authorities should be there to “clean up” after bubbles
burst, both to prevent systemic problems and undesired downward pres-
sure on economic activity or inﬂation.
Relative to this consensus, I would argue that:
1. Asset bubbles are not that hard to identify—especially large ones.
2. If one means by monetary policy the instrument of short-term inter-
est rates, then I agree that monetary policy is not well-suited to deal with
asset bubbles. But this suggests that central bankers should examine the
eﬃcacy of other instruments in their toolbox, rather than simply ignore the
development of asset bubbles. Parenthetically, this may require develop-
ment of additional policy tools if the current tools are deemed inadequate.
3. When the possibility of additional instruments is added to the mix,
this may improve the cost/beneﬁt trade-oﬀ from addressing asset bubbles
early, prior to these bubbles bursting.
416 Remarks
William C. Dudley was an advisory director at Goldman Sachs when these comments were
presented. He is currently the executive vice president of the Markets Group at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
I thank John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein for inviting me to participate.